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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : 
JERRY DALE LOYA, : Case No. 20010058-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction1 for Receiving or Transferring a Stolen 
Vehicle, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316(2) (1998), in the 
Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Judith S. Atherton, Judge, presiding. 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the trial court err in denying the motion of Appellant Jerry Dale Loya ["Mr. Loya"] 
for a directed verdict where there is insufficient evidence to convict him of Receiving or 
Transferring a Stolen Vehicle? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
In evaluating a claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict, this 
1
 A copy of the Minutes of the "Sentence, Judgment, Commitment," R. 150-51, is 
attached in Addendum A. 
Court views ""the record evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.'" State v. 
Humphrey. 793 P.2d 918, 924 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(citation omitted). "When the findings of all 
the requisite elements of the crime can be reasonably made from the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from it, our inquiry stops, and we sustain the verdict." Id 
This issue is preserved on the record at R. 169 [119]. 
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISION 
The following statue is relevant on appeal. Utah Code Annotated section 41-la-1316 
provides: 
It is a second degree felony for a person: 
(1) with intent to procure or pass title to a motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer that 
he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken to receive 
or transfer possession of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer from or to 
another; or 
(2) to have in his possession any motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer that he 
knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken if he is not a 
peace officer engaged at the time in the performance of his duty. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316 (1998). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On 5 February 1999, nearly two years after the incident at issue in this case, Mr. Loya 
was charged by information with one count of Receiving or Transferring a Stolen Vehicle in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316 (1998). R. 3-5. An arrest warrant was issued. R. 7-8. 
On September 20th and 21st, 2000, approximately one and a half years after he was charged, Mr. 
Loya was tried before a jury. 
2 
After the State presented its evidence, Mr. Loya made a motion for a directed verdict on 
the basis that the State failed to establish a prima facie case. R. 169 [119]. The court denied the 
motion, R. 169 [120], and Mr. Loya was convicted as charged. R. 129. Mr. Loya submitted a 
timely notice of appeal. R. 152-53. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2 
Between 9 p.m. on December 29th, 1996 and 6 a.m. on December 30th, 1996 a white 
Chevy half-ton truck belonging to SKA Drywall was stolen from the West Jordon home of a 
SKA Drywall employee. R. 169 [80-82, 85-86].3 
Nearly three months later, on March 17th, 1997, Mr. Loya was at his home in Salt Lake 
City when he was visited by two acquaintances, "Jason Tucker" and "Monique." R. 169 [126-
27] .4 They were driving a white Chevy truck. R. 169 [127], About that time, a friend, "Roger 
Porter" telephoned Mr. Loya and asked his help in towing a car. Id Mr. Loya responded that his 
truck was broken, but "I told him I'd see what I could do." R. 126 [128]. Mr. Loya asked Jason 
to tow the car. Id Jason indicated that he was too busy, but he gave Mr. Loya permission to use 
the white Chevy. Id 
Mr. Loya noticed that the truck "had a smash on the front fender." Id Jason explained 
that his mother "slid off the road into a cop car in Idaho two weeks prior." R. 126 [129]. Mr. 
2
 Because the evidence must be viewed "'in the light most favorable to the verdict,'" 
Humphrey. 793 P.2d at 924, the facts are so stated. 
3
 The employee, Rob Gines, testified that a neighbor saw the truck leave at 4 a.m. R. 126 
[82]. 
4
 Mr. Loya described Monique as an "acquaintance," and explained that he had known 
Jason for about six months, and had seen him three or four times. R. 126 [126-27]. 
3 
Loya also found that the ignition was missing. Id Jason told Mr. Loya that the truck had 
electrical problems, and showed him how to start the truck by holding in the clutch and rotating 
the classic cylinder until the Check Engine light came on. Id At that point, the truck would start. 
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Mr. Loya drove the truck to Roger's house in Magna. R. 126 [130]. A flatbed trailer with 
a covered car loaded onto it was hooked up to the truck. Id, Mr. Loya and Roger drove to a gas 
station to put gas in the truck. Id Then they returned to Roger's house to pick up "Holly," who 
needed to go to Grantsville, where the car was being towed. R. 126 [131]. With Mr. Loya 
driving, the three went down 21st South and headed west on the freeway. Id The car cover soon 
came off the car and was flapping around. Id Mr. Loya pulled over on a "little side street 
heading towards Saltair, right off the side of the freeway," replaced the car cover, and started 
tying it down. R. 126 [132]. 
Shortly beforehand, Deputy Henry Beltran ["Deputy Beltran"] was patrolling Salt Lake 
County property in the west Magna area. R. 126 [88-89]. A citizen approached him with 
information regarding a white Chevy truck that was pulling a trailer with a car loaded on it. R. 
126 [91-93]. Deputy Beltran radioed the information to dispatch and requested that other 
deputies aid him in searching for the vehicle. Id Deputy Kevin Scott Barrett ["Deputy Barrett"], 
who was working an off-duty job at Cyprus High School, heard the description of the vehicle 
over his radio. R. 126 [97-98]. Driving an unmarked patrol car, he soon discovered the vehicle 
on 21st South, State Road 201. R. 126 [98-99]. The vehicle had stopped at the side of the road and 
two men, later identified as Mr. Loya and Roger, were replacing a car cover on the car. R. 126 
[99]. A third person, later identified as Holly, was sitting in the cab of the truck. R. 126 [101]. 
Deputy Barrett radioed that he had found the vehicle, and other deputies began to arrive to "back 
4 
[him] up." R. 126 [100]. 
The first to arrive was Deputy Kevin Matthews ["Deputy Matthews"]. R. 126 [103]. 
Deputy Matthews testified that, immediately after his arrival, he asked Mr. Loya to step to the 
side of the road to speak with him. R. 126 [105]. Mr. Loya told Deputy Matthews that he had 
been driving the truck and that it was loaned to him by a friend. R. 126 [105].5 Mr. Loya's 
manner was natural and unsuspicious. R. 126 [108-09].6 Deputy Matthews took the vehicle 
identification number of the truck and ran a check on it through the National Crime Information 
system. Id. He learned that the vehicle had been stolen. R. 126 [106]. He also noticed that the 
ignition of the vehicle had been tampered with. Id 
Two other officers, Deputy Danny Troester ["Deputy Troester"] and Deputy Jeff 
Andreason ["Deputy Andreason"] arrived on the scene. R. 126 [110, 114]. Deputy Beltran also 
arrived. R. 126 [93].7 Deputy Troester testified that he looked in the cab of the truck and saw two 
scanners. One of them was turned on and was monitoring the same frequency used by the 
deputies and dispatchers of the West Magna division. R. 126 [111]. Deputies Andreason and 
Beltran also saw the scanner monitoring the West Magna frequency. R. 126 [94-95, 139-40]. 
This scanner was tucked into the driver's side visor. R. 126 [140]. 
Mr. Loya was subsequently arrested. R. 126 [132]. At trial, there was conflicting 
5
 Mr. Loya provided this information to Deputy Matthews on his own accord prior to 
being questioned. R. 126 [104-05]. 
6
 After refreshing his memory with transcript of his testimony from the preliminary 
hearing, Officer Matthews testified that Mr. Loya's demeanor when he made the statement about 
driving the truck was "that he was just driving the Chevy truck like there was no harm in it." R. 
126 [107-09]. 
7
 Deputy Beltran testified that when he arrived he saw "about five or six deputies" on the 
scene. R. 126 [93]. 
5 
testimony regarding the method used to start the truck. Mr. Loya testified that the truck was 
started as follows: 
[Y]ou'd rotate [the plastic sleeve on the steering column], I didn't have the clutch 
in to push the cylinder with my finger, just stick a pin inside, and rotate it until the 
Check Engine light came and push in the clutch and it would start. 
R. 126 [134]. On the other hand, Deputy Andreason, who started the truck at the scene, testified 
that he was able to start it simply by pushing in the clutch. R. 126 [141]. He also testified that he 
"had never seen anything wired like it before that or wired like it since then." R. 126 [146]. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Mr. Loya's conviction for Receiving or Transferring a Stolen Vehicle should be reversed 
because the State failed to present sufficient evidence of intent. The most that the State can 
muster, viewing the case in the light most favorable to the State, see Humphrey. 793 P.2d at 924 
(in reviewing sufficiency of evidence claims, the evidence must be viewed "in the light most 
favorable to the verdict'")(citation omitted), is that the white truck was wired, a scanner tuned to 
the west Magna police frequency was found in the truck, and Mr. Loya told Officer Matthews 
that he was driving the borrowed vehicle. This evidence cannot be stretched so far as to prove 
that Mr. Loya knew or had reason to believe that the white truck was stolen. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-la-1316(2) (1998) (A person commits the crime of receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle 
when he has "in his possession any motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer that me knows or has 
reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken if he is not a peace officer engaged at the 
time in the performance of his duty.") 
Evidence that the truck was wired does not support the element of intent because a 
vehicle may be wired for many reasons other than that it is stolen. A lack of funds to repair the 
6 
ignition, a lack of funds to remove a key that has broken off in the ignition, and a lack of funds 
to have new keys made when the old ones are lost are common reason for having a wired 
vehicle. Among those with limited resources, a wired vehicle is not automatically suspect 
because it is easily explained by a lack of funds for repairs. In fact, that was the explanation 
given to Mr. Loya in this case. R. 126 [129]. Additionally, Mr. Loya did not know Jason well 
and had the truck for only a short period of time, consequently, he did not have enough 
information from which to infer that the truck was stolen. 
Further, evidence that a scanner in the truck was tuned to the same frequency used by 
police does not support the element of intent because the evidence and inferences do not indicate 
that Mr. Loya placed the scanner there. Additionally, Mr. Loya did not attempt to evade police 
when the news that police were looking for his truck was broadcast over the airwaves. R. 126 
[131-32]. In fact, he made himself and his vehicle conspicuous by driving down a major freeway 
towing a car with a loose car cover. R. 126 [131]. Then he pulled off the freeway in plain site to 
tie down the cover. R. 126 [132]. 
Finally, evidence that Mr. Loya told Deputy Matthews that he was the driver of the 
borrowed vehicle does not support the element of intent. This statement was not an admission or 
confession, and was made after Deputy Matthews asked Mr. Loya to step over to the side of the 
road for questioning. Deputy Matthews himself indicated that Mr. Loya's manner was natural 
and unsuspicious. R. 126 [108-09]. Therefore, this evidence does not support that Mr. Loya 
knew or had reason to believe that the white truck was stolen. 
7 
ARGUMENT 
BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT A QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE 
THAT MR. LOYA KNEW OR HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE TRUCK 
WAS STOLEN, AND RELIED INSTEAD UPON CONJECTURE, MR. LOYA'S 
CONVICTION SHOULD BE REVERSED 
In arguing that Mr. Loya knew or had reason to believe that the truck was stolen, the 
State's reliance upon evidence that the truck was started without a key, that scanners were set up 
in the truck, and that Mr. Loya admitted to being the driver is fatally weak and amounts to 
nothing more than conjecture. 
To convict Mr. Loya of Receiving or Transferring a Stolen Vehicle, the State is required 
to show that Mr. Loya knew or had reason to believe that the white Chevy truck was stolen. Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-la-1316(2) (1998). In determining whether this element of intent is supported 
by sufficient evidence, this Court recognizes that "'[k]nowledge or belief of the stolen character 
of goods is seldom directly proved and is usually inferred from the facts and circumstances in 
evidence.'" State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525, 536 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)(quoting State v. Sales. 857 
S.W.2d 480,481 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)). However, the evidence must still be sufficient to support 
the jury's verdict "beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Lamm. 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980). 
Further, "criminal convictions may not be based upon conjectures or probabilities and before we 
can uphold a conviction it must be supported by a quantum of evidence concerning each element 
of the crime as charged from which the jury may base its conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt." State v. Murphy. 617 P.2d 399,402 (Utah 1980). 
The evidence, fully marshaled to support the finding that Mr. Loya knew or had reason to 
believe that the truck was stolen is as follows: 
* The truck was wired. R. 126 [134, 140-42]. Mr. Loya testified that the truck was started 
8 
by pressing the wiring with a pin, rotating the cylinder, and pressing on the clutch. R. 126 [134]. 
On the other hand, Deputy Andreason testified that the truck was started simply by pressing on 
the clutch. R. 126 [141].8 Deputy Andreason also indicated that the wiring was unusual and that 
he had not seen anything like it before. R. 126 [146]. 
* Two scanners were in the truck, and one of them was tuned to the same frequency used 
by the west Magna division of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs office. R. 126 [140, 147]. This 
scanner was found tucked in the driver's side visor. R. 126 [140]. 
* When Deputy Matthews asked Mr. Loya to step over to the side of the road to speak 
with him, Mr. Loya indicated, without prompting, that he had been driving the vehicle and that 
he had borrowed it from Jason. R. 126 [105]. However, Mr. Loya's manner was natural and 
unsuspicious. R. 126 [108-09]. 
This evidence, "stretched to its utmost limits,"9 is not sufficient to infer the element of intent 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the prosecutor's argument to the contrary, R. 126 [175-78], was 
nothing more than conjecture and speculation. 
First, evidence that the truck was started without a key is not sufficient to show intent in 
light of the unique way that the truck was wired, the fact that Mr. Loya had borrowed the truck 
only a short time before, and the reality that wired cars are not unusual among people who have 
8
 These conflicting testimonies are irrelevant to the issue of whether there was intent 
because it is the fact that the truck was wired, rather than how it was wired, which is relevant. 
Additionally, three and a half years had passed since the incident in question, neither Mr. Loya 
nor Deputy Andreason had written notes concerning the wiring, R. 126 [145-46], and the wired 
truck could have been started in a number of ways. Therefore, conflicting testimony regarding 
how the truck was wired is not meaningful and is a peripheral matter. 
9
 See State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 445 (Utah 1983)(Notwithstanding the presumptions 
in favor of the jury's verdict, "[t]he evidence, stretched to its utmost limits, must be sufficient to 
prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.") 
9 
limited funds with which to make repairs. Deputy Andreason, who has nine years of experience 
as a police officer and has seen many stolen cars with wired ignition switches, R. 126 [116, 145-
46], testified that he had "never seen anything wired like [the truck] before that or wired like it 
since then." R. 126 [146]. This strongly suggests that the truck was not wired like that of a 
typical stolen car. Thus, even if Mr. Loya was familiar with stolen cars, which the record does 
not indicate, this unusual method of wiring would not have indicated to him that the car was 
stolen. In fact, the unusual wiring is consistent with the circumstances of someone who needs to 
make his vehicle functional, but does not know precisely how to wire it. This is corroborative of 
Mr. Loya's understanding that the car was wired due to electrical problems. R. 126 [129]. 
Additionally, a finding of intent that rests upon the basis that the truck was wired 
presupposes that wired vehicles are typically stolen vehicles. This presupposition is not 
supported. There are many legitimate reasons for a car to be wired, including the owner's lack of 
funds to fix the ignition, lack of funds to remove a key that has broken off in the ignition, and 
lack of funds to have new keys made when the old ones are lost. Among people with limited 
resources, these are natural reasons for having a wired vehicle. In these circumstances, crediting 
Mr. Loya with knowledge that the truck was stolen, particularly where he did not know Jason 
well and had borrowed the truck only a short time beforehand, is unreasonable because the 
circumstances werenot overtly suspicious. It also imposes upon Mr. Loya the opinions and 
attitudes of police officers and those who can always afford car repairs, and does not focus on 
whether Mr. Loya himself knew or had reason to believe that the truck was stolen. 
Recently, Oxford University Press published a collection of insightful essays by 
informed authors regarding poverty and criminal justice. Several of these essays highlight the 
increased danger of criminal convictions faced by those with limited funds because their living 
10 
conditions give rise to erroneous inferences of intent. In one essay, Northwestern University law 
professor Dorothy Roberts points out that perceptions of the middle class regarding proper child 
care often credits poverty-stricken parents with the intent to neglect their children when the harm 
was actually a direct result of the conditions of poverty, not culpable behavior. Dorothy Roberts, 
The Ethics of Punishing Indigent Parents, in From Social Justice to Criminal Justice: Poverty 
and the Administration of Criminal Law 161, 172-74 (William C. Heffernan et al. eds., 2000) 
[hereinafter Social Justice].10 In another essay, Columbia University law professor George P. 
Fletcher recognizes that poverty creates its own set of conditions which are normal given the 
lack of resources, and that those who live in these conditions sometimes engage in behavior 
which is seen by others as unexpected and therefore indicative of culpability. George P. Fletcher, 
Material Poverty - Moral Poverty, in Social Justice 264, 264-66.n 
I
 Professor Roberts differentiates between parents who are unable to provide adequate 
care for their children and those who neglect them due to the stress of poverty. She explains: 
Child neglect is sometimes a direct result of the parents' financial inability 
to provide for their children. Parents may be guilty of neglect because they are 
unable to afford adequate food, clothing, or shelter for their children. These cases 
can be distinguished from those . . . where stress resulting from poverty causes 
parents to harm their children. This type of neglect is better classified as a crime 
defined by poverty rather than a crime caused by poverty. Parents who experience 
stress may be held liable for hurting their children because they are nevertheless 
capable of conforming to the law. Parents who have no money to provide for their 
children's needs, however, are incapable of conforming to the law. 
Id at 172. 
II
 Professor Fletcher indicates that the source of this misunderstanding is as follows: 
Each society makes certain demands on its inhabitants and citizens. It expects 
them to function in certain ways to earn their bread, to contribute to the group 
defense, and to participate in rearing the next generation. Poverty is a condition 
that disables people from functioning in the expected manner. It is a handicap 
relative to the society in which it occurs. 
11 
Although these essays examine more severe conditions and more severe crimes than 
those at issue here, insights from these essays are directly applicable in this case. The assumption 
that a wired car is a stolen car ignores the reality that those without money often wire their cars 
because of a lack of funds to repair them. A wired car, therefore, would not seem highly unusual 
or suspicious to someone of limited means. In this case, the white truck could easily have been 
wired because of the lack of funds for repairs, and in fact, this was the explanation given to Mr. 
Loya. R. 126 [129]. Given these circumstances, this evidence cannot be stretched far enough to 
support the element of intent required in this case. 
Id. at 265-66. He also highlights how certain material circumstances are wrongly perceived by 
those living outside of those conditions. He writes: 
Poverty could not be defined by the presence of certain physically threatening or 
uncomfortable conditions, such as those we typically associate with the American 
urban ghettos of the late twentieth century, that is, rat-infested apartments, broken 
plumbing, noise, filth, and crowding. For if you took the same conditions and 
transferred them to a native American village or the Jewish shtetl of the Middle 
Ages, they might even appear luxurious. Imagine: only rats threatening you, 
indoor plumbing that words sometimes, occasional pick-up of the trash, paved 
streets, doors you could close to keep out the neighbors' stares - not to mention 
food available at the corner market (even with food stamps), the possibility of 
cooking without chopping wood, occasional heat available in winter, and medical 
treatment without leeches. 
Id. at 265. Further, he explains that deprivation, even without poverty, may result in erroneous 
inferences drawn by outsiders. He writes: 
Imagine someone who grows up in an Amish community, with all the comforts of 
farm life, but who learns to speak only Pennsylvania Dutch and has never heard 
of a computer. There is neither deprivation nor a handicap relative to life within 
the community, but if the person chooses to leave the barriers are enormous. I do 
not think it is correct to say that life on an Amish farm is a life of poverty, but the 
limitations of the lifestyle certainly make it more difficult to function in the 
outside society. The same would be true of the kid who grows up speaking only 
black English, Southwest Spanglish, or Brooklyn Yiddish. 
Id. at 266. 
12 
Second, evidence that a scanner in the truck was tuned to the same frequency used by the 
west Magna division of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs office is not indicative of intent because 
Mr. Loya had borrowed the vehicle only a short time beforehand, R. 126 [129-32], there is no 
evidence or inference that Mr. Loya owned the scanner, and furthermore, even if he listened to 
police activity, this does not show he knew or had reason to believe that the truck he was driving 
was stolen. Any inference that Mr. Loya used the scanner to monitor police activity in order to 
evade police is unreasonable in light of the evidence. Initially, Mr. Loya made himself 
conspicuous by towing a car on a major freeway with a loosely-tied tarp. R. 126 [131]. After a 
search for the truck was issued over the airwaves, Mr. Loya did not attempt to conceal himself or 
his vehicle. R. 126 [91-93]. Instead, he pulled off the freeway in plain sight, R. 126 [132], got 
out of the car, and spent several minutes adjusting the flyaway car cover. IdL This evidence does 
not support an inference that Mr. Loya knew or had reason to believe that the white truck was 
stolen. 
Finally, evidence that Mr. Loya told Deputy Matthews that he had been driving the 
vehicle and that he had borrowed it from Jason does not support an inference of intent. Mr. Loya 
made this comment to Deputy Matthews after Deputy Matthews asked him to step over to the 
side of the road for questioning. R. 126 [105]. Mr. Loya's manner when he spoke was natural 
and unsuspicious. R. 126 [108-09]. Further, there is nothing about Mr. Loya's comment that is 
surprising or unusual, given that Mr. Loya had not been pulled over for a traffic stop and there 
was no apparent reason for the officer's questioning beyond some problem with the vehicle. The 
comment did not amount to an admission or confession.12 Thus, this evidence does not support 
12
 Confessions "are special types of admissions because they contain admissions of the 
criminal act itself and not mere admissions upon which guilt may be inferred." State v. Johnson, 
13 
an inference of intent. 
The element of intent is completely unsupported in this case because there is nothing to 
show that Mr. Loya knew or had reason to believe that the white truck was stolen. The most that 
can be mustered by the State is that the truck was started without a key, a scanner in the truck 
was monitoring the police frequency, and Mr. Loya told an officer at the scene that he had been 
driving the truck and that it had been loaned to him by a friend. R. 126 [176-78]. Intent, 
therefore, is shown only by conjecture and speculation, and Mr. Loya's conviction cannot be 
upheld on this basis. Murphy, 617 P.2d at 402. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the above, Mr. Loya respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25AJL day of May, 2001. 
L ^ W . Mgpv^*^ 
HEATHER JQKNSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
JOHN O'CONNELL, JR. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
821 P.2d 1150, 1162 n.7 (Utah 1991). Where statements by a defendant are incomplete, vague, 
and unspecific, they don't amount to a confession to specific elements of a crime or to the 
requisite mental state. State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214, 1218 (Utah 1985). 
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ADDENDUM A 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JERRY DALE LOYA, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
CHANGE OF PLEA 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 991904376 FS 
Judge: JUDITH S. ATHERTON 
Date: December 18, 2000 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lorip 
Prosecutor: POSTMA, MICHAEL E 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): OCONNELL, JOHN D JR 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: September 28, 1970 
Video 
Tape Number: VIDEO Tape Count: 11.44 
CHARGES 
1. RECEIVE OR TRANSFER STOLEN VEHICLE - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/20/2000 {Guilty Plea} 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of RECEIVE OR TRANSFER STOLEN 
VEHICLE a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Page 1 0015C 
Case No: 991904376 
Date: Dec 18, 2000 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
COMMITMENT TO RUN CONCURRENT WITH OTHER COMMITMENTS. 
Credit is granted for time served 
Dated this /Q day of JJiC 
J U D 1 T H / S . ATiilSKTVW "• i O 
Di&trlct Courty Judge l/\ 
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